

Global Outlook

April 2025



- The 90-day pause in U.S. tariffs has eased short-term fears of a trade/financial shock but has not eliminated recession risks. A contraction in activity later this year remains plausible, as uncertainty continues to weigh on corporate investment decisions and consumer sentiment.
- Despite the pause, the U.S. maintains a complex tariff structure: 10% baseline tariff on most imports, 25% tariffs on steel, aluminum, and vehicles, 25% tariffs on Canadian and Mexican goods not compliant with USMCA, Tariffs on Chinese goods raised to 125%, with no active negotiations in place.
- The environment reinforces global trade fragmentation and adds volatility to supply chain strategies. US inflation is still likely to increase around summer.
- Should the recession scenario materialize, Fed rate cuts remain on the table but may be delayed until end-2025, as the central bank assesses the growth and inflation impact of current trade tensions. A gradual path toward 3.5-3.0% is still expected by mid-2026.
- Volatility is expected to persist within wide ranges, but structural factors — including above-target inflation, Fed credibility concerns, higher term premium, and elevated risk premium — argue in favor of structurally higher long-term yields.

Tariffs implications on global outlook

Trump's 2025 Tariff Action: Structure, Rationale, and Timeline

- Strategic Rationale Executive Order (April 2, 2025) declares a national emergency due to persistent, asymmetric U.S. goods trade deficits (>\$1.2 trillion in 2024).
- Objective: Re-establish reciprocity in global trade relations under Presidential authority (IEEPA).
- Baseline 10% tariff remains on most imports (with exemptions) for 90 days, excluding China (125%).


| Measure | Description | Start Date |
|-------------------|---|--|
| Baseline tariff | +10% ad valorem on all import | April 5, 2025 |
| Reciprocal tariff | Country-specific ad-valorem rates (up to 50%) based on estimated imbalances | Pause for 90 days excluding China (125%) |

Trump's 2025 Tariff Action: Detailed Exemptions to the 2025 Tariff Regime


1. **Legally protected categories (50 U.S.C. §1702(b))** Exempted by statute under IEEPA, including: personal remittances and humanitarian aid, informational materials (books, films, software, news), donations of food, medicine, and medical supplies
2. **Goods already covered by Section 232 national security tariffs:** To avoid duplication, existing duties remain in place:
 - Steel: 25%
 - Aluminum: 10%
 - Derivatives of steel/aluminum: 25% / 10%
 - Automobiles and parts: 25%
3. **Strategic products explicitly excluded.** To preserve essential supply chains and inputs: Pharmaceuticals, Semiconductors, Copper and lumber articles, Critical minerals and energy not sufficiently available in the U.S.
4. **Precious metals in bulk form** (e.g. gold, silver bars) to protect financial and monetary stability
5. **Future Section 232 categories.** Products under national security review (e.g. chemicals, solar panels) are pre-exempted if later included under Section 232
6. **USMCA treatment** (Canada & Mexico): USMCA-compliant goods" are those that meet the agreement's rules of origin and qualify for tariff-free treatment under the U.S.–Mexico–Canada Agreement
 - USMCA-compliant goods: 0%
 - Non-compliant goods: 25%
 - Non-compliant energy and potash: 10%
7. **China:** Tariffs have increased to 125%, reinforcing Washington's confrontational stance amid ongoing retaliatory

Trump's 2025 Tariff Action: China focus

China Trade Balance with USA



China: Trade Balance by country
USD bn (above 20 USD bn)





Source: TAC ECONOMICS, US Census, China NBS

Tariffs on trade, support to domestic demand: where from now?

Major headwinds from a trade perspective, a result of the incipient trade war between the US and China and the perceived risk of China's export swamping non-US markets... But stronger domestic policies to support demand and growth have been the central feature of the past Two Sessions in March.


China: contribution of demand components to y/y GDP growth (% points)



- Overall, the authorities aim at reviving domestic growth through government-backed urban redevelopment projects (while improving living conditions in most informal/dilapidated urban areas) and a more business- / private sector-friendly environment to boost confidence and facilitate innovation.
- Highlight on technological development, with a large range of measures to support ongoing technology innovation and adoption, including broader capital market and financing support.
- Cyclical policy to support consumption with an ambitious ~5% target for GDP growth: extension of consumer goods trade-in programme, raise in minimum wages, expansion of social security coverage, childcare subsidies, etc.
- Challenge revealed on adjusting capacities as excessive supply keep deflationary pressures and raised firms' profitability: decommissioning of outdated and inefficient production capacities (higher standards, window guidance for firms).

What can our models say on short-term growth in China?

- Using different models (linear, non-linear) to capture the quarterly dynamics of China's GDP growth and using "complementary techniques to simulate shocks.
- The highest uncertainties relate to...
 - Trade development between China and non-US markets,
 - Transmission of trade tensions to other areas (access to technology, corporate presence and activities...)
 - Confidence within China, in-between economic downturn and the balance between structural trends, political objectives and saving behavior.



- The IMF's April 2025 baseline outlines a coherent global outlook, but it increasingly feels misaligned with market realities and political developments.
- It excludes recent US tariffs and assumes a soft landing in the US with limited fallout from trade fragmentation — a view that appears overly optimistic.
- Hard data, especially on payrolls and investment, suggest weakening momentum.
- Inflation risks are also likely underappreciated, particularly in the US, where strong demand could amplify tariff pass-through. In contrast, Europe may face persistent imported pressures despite softer domestic inflation.
- Crucially, the IMF's own downside scenarios highlight much steeper risks — including a 20% GDP drop for China and 6% for the US in the event of sudden decoupling. These extremes, however, are absent from the central forecast.
- Ultimately, the baseline offers policy guidance, but likely understates both economic fragility and the cost of deepening global fragmentation.


| Scenario | Global Growth 2025 | Global Inflation 2025 | Key Assumptions |
|----------|--------------------|-----------------------|--|
| Baseline | 2.80% | 4.30% | Tariffs pre-Apr 5 only Gradual disinflation Managed China slowdown" |
| Adverse | ~2.2% (-0.6 pt) | ~4.4% (+0.1 pt) | Full tariff retaliation Persistent uncertainty Tighter global financing" |
| Upside | ~3.2% (-0.4 pt) | ~4.1% (+0.2 pt) | US fiscal consolidation EU stimulus Coordinated China recovery" |

| Region | Adverse Scenario (Growth) | Adverse Scenario (Inflation) | Upside Scenario (Growth) | Upside Scenario (Inflation) |
|-----------|------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------------|
| USA | -0.8 pt | +0.5 pt | +0.4 pt | -0.2 pt |
| Euro Area | -0.5 pt | +0.2 pt | +0.3 pt | -0.1 pt |
| China | -1.0 pt | stable or ↓ | +0.5 pt | mild ↑ |

EM Outlook

Resilience of real economic performances up to Q12025

GDP growth contributions y/y, 10 Key EM




Manufacturing Purchasing Manager Index




Resilience of real economic performances up to Q12025

RiskMonitor – Average Activity Risk ratings per horizon from 0 (lowest risk) to 100 (highest risk)




RiskMonitor – *real economic pressure* (leading indicator of momentum of domestic demand)




Global Trade Reconfiguration: Emerging Markets Set to Benefit from Fragmentation

Merchandise export volume per region
Annual change




Export market share (TAC International Trade Model)
of total




Trade diversification

Exports to US & China vs Market Concentration Index





Improved Forex Liquidity Strengthens EM Resilience, but Idiosyncratic Risks Remain

Fiscal dynamic of GDP, average per region



Country Risk Premium (in basis points)


Endogenous country risk measure combining economic, financial and political indicators



Source: TAC ECONOMICS Datalab

GeoPolitical Sensitivity Index (from 0 low to 100 high)

Country sensitivity to geopolitical risk based on three key dimensions: alliances, current conflicts & sanctions, and critical locks & knots



EM Risks and opportunities: Trump Vulnerability

Trump Vulnerability Ranking

Measure of country-level exposure to trade, security, and immigration risks under the second Trump presidency.

Top20 – Higher Risk

| Rank over 164 countries ISO3 Country | Trade | Security | Immigration | Overall vulnerability | Class Overall |
|---|-------------|-------------|-------------|-----------------------|------------------|
| 1 MEX Mexico | 74.9 | 48.2 | 63.4 | 62.1 | E |
| 2 JAM Jamaica | 43.2 | 43.2 | 66.5 | 50.9 | E |
| 3 CHN China | 56.1 | 41.2 | 50.2 | 49.2 | D |
| 4 IND India | 37.8 | 36.4 | 51.7 | 41.9 | D |
| 5 HTI Haiti | 50.5 | 30.5 | 43.2 | 41.4 | D |
| 6 VNM Vietnam | 51.4 | 39.8 | 31.5 | 40.9 | D |
| 7 JPN Japan | 65.0 | 42.5 | 4.3 | 37.3 | D |
| 8 SLV El Salvador | 11.2 | 18.4 | 80.9 | 36.8 | D |
| 9 HND Honduras | 14.3 | 26.8 | 67.1 | 36.0 | D |
| 10 DOM Dominican Republic | 16.9 | 21.1 | 68.2 | 35.4 | D |
| 11 EGY Egypt | 26.6 | 68.3 | 9.8 | 34.9 | C |
| 12 PHL Philippines | 30.6 | 25.6 | 46.9 | 34.3 | C |
| 13 SOM Somalia | 26.1 | 67.9 | 8.2 | 34.1 | C |
| 14 GTM Guatemala | 10.0 | 23.8 | 67.0 | 33.6 | C |
| 15 DEU Germany | 55.0 | 40.5 | 4.3 | 33.3 | C |
| 16 GMB The Gambia | 25.2 | 47.1 | 27.2 | 33.2 | C |
| 17 BLZ Belize | 30.5 | 48.8 | 16.5 | 31.9 | C |
| 18 IRL Ireland | 44.6 | 49.0 | 1.4 | 31.6 | C |
| 19 MDA Moldova | 25.5 | 63.7 | 4.0 | 31.0 | C |
| 20 NPL Nepal | 28.7 | 44.4 | 18.2 | 30.4 | C |

| Rank over 164 countries ISO3 Country | Trade | Security | Immigration | Overall vulnerability |
|---|-------------|-------------|-------------|-----------------------|
| 41 ZAF South Africa | 29.5 | 46.6 | 3.6 | 26.6 |
| 45 IDN Indonesia | 30.6 | 46.7 | 1.8 | 26.4 |
| 61 TUR Türkiye | 27.1 | 40.6 | 7.0 | 24.9 |
| 69 UKR Ukraine | 25.5 | 34.4 | 13.7 | 24.5 |
| 71 BRA Brazil | 28.6 | 19.8 | 24.4 | 24.3 |
| 72 TUN Tunisia | 25.9 | 42.8 | 3.8 | 24.1 |
| 86 AGO Angola | 25.7 | 42.2 | 0.5 | 22.8 |
| 92 BLR Belarus | 25.0 | 39.0 | 2.4 | 22.2 |
| 102 THA Thailand | 37.4 | 20.8 | 6.1 | 21.4 |
| 105 ARM Armenia | 25.4 | 28.9 | 7.8 | 20.7 |
| 108 RUS Russia | 26.5 | 26.0 | 9.0 | 20.5 |
| 109 SAU Saudi Arabia | 26.9 | 31.5 | 2.8 | 20.4 |
| 111 SRB Serbia | 25.6 | 32.8 | 1.8 | 20.1 |
| 112 BHR Bahrain | 2.6 | 56.2 | 0.2 | 19.6 |
| 115 QAT Qatar | 25.6 | 32.6 | 0.4 | 19.5 |
| 120 ARE United Arab Emirates | 25.7 | 29.4 | 2.0 | 19.0 |
| 123 DZA Algeria | 27.0 | 25.4 | 3.2 | 18.5 |
| 125 ARG Argentina | 27.6 | 22.8 | 4.2 | 18.2 |
| 143 COL Colombia | 8.9 | 11.8 | 24.4 | 15.0 |
| 160 MAR Morocco | 0.9 | 29.0 | 5.5 | 11.8 |
| 161 PER Peru | 4.7 | 20.0 | 9.7 | 11.5 |
| 164 CHL Chile | 4.7 | 15.8 | 1.8 | 7.4 |

Source: TAC ECONOMICS Datalab

Low growth, low risk
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Czech Republic, Australia, Singapore
→ Prioritise for reliability.

High growth, moderate risk
Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Poland,
Morocco
 → High potential for diversification.
 Invest with selective risk
 management.

High growth, evolving landscape
India, Vietnam, Philippines
→ Promising markets calibrated
investment strategies. Close
monitoring, supplier mapping,
and risk buffers recommended.

Low growth, high risk
Mexico, Turkey, Nigeria
→ Reconsider exposure. Identify indirect dependencies. Explore reshoring or third-country triangulation.

36

Contacts

Léa Dauphas

Directrice Générale Déléguée, Chief economist

lea.dauphas@taceconomics.com

Tel: 33 2 99 39 31 40

